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I

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

VICTOR OGDEN and ANGIE OGDEN,
husband and wife,

)

Appellants/Plaintiffs,
vs.
IB PRINTING COMPANY, a Utah Joint
Venture, and Gary Richards, Mary
Richards, Michelle Richards, and
Ronald Richards, and related parties,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

)
)
)

Supreme Ct. Case No. 950126
Priority No.

)
)

[Dis. Ct. No. 940300038]

Appellees/Defendants.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal brought pursuant to Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure; which provides, in part, that an appeal may be taken from a District Court to
an appropriate Appellate Court from all final orders. Jurisdiction before this Court is
further based upon the fact that the Utah Court of Appeals does not have mandatory
statutory jurisdiction over this appeal; nor has this matter, to the knowledge of appellants,
been assigned to the Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78-2a-3, 1953
as amended.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The appellant in this case is raising three (3) issues:
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POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT HAD BEFORE IT SUFFICIENT
CREDIBLE FACTS, WHICH ARE DEEMED ADMITTED
PURSUANT TO A MOTION TO DISMISS, TO PRECLUDE
THE GRANTING OF THE MOTION TO DISMISS, OR A
SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

Standard of Appellate Review and Supporting Authority:
This Court, in the case of Demond v. FHP, 849 P.2d 598, 599 (Utah 1993) ruled
it will uphold the granting of a motion to dismiss, "only where it appears that the Plaintiff
or Plaintiffs would not be entitled to relief under the facts alleged or under any state of
facts they could prove to support their claim." The court continued," We accept the facts
as alleged in the complaint as true and consider the facts in a light most favorable to the
Plaintiff." Whether the motion to dismiss was properly granted is a question of law which
is reviewed for correctness. See St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hospital. 811
P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991). Appellants believe that under a correctness standard, the
reviewing court should give no deference to the trial court's finding of fact or application
of law, but should resolve the issue de novo from the record before it.
A substantially similar standard is applied to a motion to dismiss treated as a
motion for summary judgment when matters outside the pleadings are, or may be,
considered. See Lynn v. Lynch, 665 P.2d 1276,1278 (Utah 1983); Thavne v. Beneficial
Utah. Inc.. 874 P.2d 120, 124 (Utah 1994).
Citation to Record showing preservation of issue: Complaint of Plaintiffs,
particularly paragraphs 2, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11. [Record on Appeal ("ROA"), pgs. 1-20];
Affidavit of Victor Ogden [ROA pgs. 87 to 96 ]; Memorandum of Plaintiffs' in Opposition
6

to Motion to Dismiss [ROA pgs. 70 to 86]; Plaintiffs' Informal Petition for Reconsideration
[ROApgs. 114-124].

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED MANIFEST AND
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO DISMISS BY APPARENTLY EXCLUDING
FROM ITS CONSIDERATION MATERIAL FACTS, AND BY
MISSTATING OTHER MATERIAL FACTS.

Standard of Appellate Review and Supporting Authority:
In Colman v. Utah State Land Bd.. 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990), this Court held
dismissal is a severe measure and should be granted only if there are no state of facts
supporting the claim.

Here, the court could only fail to find supporting facts for

exercising jurisdiction over the defendants by consciously excluding consideration of the
imputed "facts" as stated in the complaint and the affidavit of Mr. Ogden. See prior
authority as to "review for correctness" standard to be applied.
Citation to Record: See above.

POINT III
THE COURT ERRORED IN THE LEGAL APPLICATION OF
THE FORUM NON CONVENIENS DOCTRINE IN
DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT.
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Standard of Appellate Review and Supporting Authority:
Presuming this Court does not summarily remand to the trial court for failure to
consider necessary and relevant jurisdictional facts as outlined above, plaintiffs maintain
the defendants would not meet the tests for an equitable dismissal under the forum non
conveniens doctrine. Utah law on forum non conveniens is almost exclusively contained
in the case of Summa Corporation v. Laneer Industries, Inc., 559 P.2d 544, 546 (Utah
1977).
In Summa, this Court held that the doctrine of forum non conveniens should be
applied with "great caution" and only under "compelling circumstances" when it was
clear that the interests or rights of non-resident defendants would be substantially
impaired in proceeding. In this case, there has been no such showing or finding of
impairment. It is apparently a matter of first impression before the court as to whether
the Summa doctrine is not subsumed and incorporated in the long arm statute "tests" for
insuring "fair play" and "substantial justice." Because the doctrine involves dismissal the
review standard should be one of "review for correctness" as annotated above.
Citation to Record: Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss,
particularly pgs. 11-12, [ROA pgs. 75-76]; Plaintiffs' Informal Petition for Reconsideration;
particularly pgs. 3-4. [ROA pgs. 114-124].
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES OR RULES
Appellants do not believe that there are any determinative statutes in this case, but
believe the Court will need to review the Utah Long Arm Statute, U C A § 78-27-22 et
seq; and, particularly, § 78-27-24 of the Act. Appellants would also maintain that URCP,
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Rule 12(b) and, URCP Rule 56, by implication and reference, may be determinative of
some or all of the issues presented in this proceeding.

STATEMENT OF CASE
A.

Nature of the Case,
On August 5,1994, the Ogdens commenced this case by filing a Complaint

in the Third District Court, in and for Tooele County, State of Utah, alleging that Gary
Richards, Mary Richards, Michelle Richards and Ronald Richards (hereinafter collectively
referred to as "the Richards"), in an individual capacity and acting as participants in the
IB Printing Company (hereinafter "IB") had breached a business agreement with the
Ogdens resulting in substantial damages to the Ogdens.
Specifically, the Ogdens alleged as to the Richards and IB as follows:
(i)

That the Richards had breached a specific contractual agreement to
return investment capital to the Ogdens as earlier agreed, plus
granting to them a twenty-five percent (25%) interest in the IB
Printing business for the Ogdens' contribution of all initial
capitalization and various start-up services and expertise.

(ii)

Alternatively, that the Ogdens were damaged as alleged above, but
were entitled to relief under a theory of partnership by estoppel.

(ili)

Alternatively, that the Ogdens were entitled to recovery against the
Richards under a doctrine of contract implied-in-law or fact arising
out of the failure of the Richards to return the agreed upon capital
and interest to the Ogdens and failing to grant them any interest in
the company.

(iv)

For additional and resulting damages from alleged fraud, conversion
and mismanagement by the Richards in the operation of the IB
business.
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(v)

A special claim for equitable relief requesting the trial court to order
the return of all of the capital equipment from the Richards to the
Ogdens upon the basis that monetary damages would not
adequately protect the Ogdens from ongoing losses and damages
in this proceeding and that the printing equipment was not being
employed in the business.

On January 10, 1995, the Court entered a Minute Entry denying defendants'
Request for Evidentiary Hearing and granting defendants' Motion to Dismiss upon the
apparent basis of lack of sufficient contacts by defendants with the forum jurisdiction;
and, alternatively, under a forum non conveniens doctrine.
Subsequently, on January 16, 1995, counsel for the Ogdens filed an informal
memorandum by letter requesting reconsideration by the Court of its dismissal based
upon the allegation that the Court had supported its Memorandum Decision from facts
which were disputed or in error from the Affidavits before the Court and asking the Court
to informally amend or rescind its prior ruling.
On January 24, 1995, the Court again entered a Minute Entry affirming its decision
to Dismiss, apparently more specifically limiting the basis of its ruling to the equitable
doctrine of forum non conveniens. On or about February 23, 1995, the Court entered
a formal Order affirming its earlier Order of Dismissal. The Ogdens then perfected an
Appeal from both the Order of Dismissal and the subsequent Order Affirming Dismissal
as filed with the Third District Court on March 16, 1995 and filed a cash cost bond on
appeal on or about such date.
B;

Essential Course of Proceedings.
(1)

On August 5, 1994, plaintiffs caused their counsel of record to file a

Complaint in this proceeding, [ROA, pgs. 0 to 20].
10

(2)

Defendants were personally served in the State of Nevada by a

Nevada Process Server with Return of Service filed with this Court, [ROA pgs. 40 to 45].
(3)

The Richards and IB Printing filed a Motion to Dismiss by their

present counsel of record, Mr. Randy S. Ludlow, Esq., with the Third District Court on
September 27, 1994, essentially alleging a lack of personal jurisdiction and the forum
non conveniens defense, [ROA pgs. 49 to 50].
(4)

The Motion to Dismiss of defendants was supported by a

Memorandum in Support, [ROA pgs. 51 to 62].
(5)

The defendants also filed an Affidavit by Mr. Gary Richards, one of

the named defendants, in support of their Motion to Dismiss on or about September 27,
1994, [ROA pgs. 63 to 69].
(6)

The Ogdens then filed a Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion

to Dismiss with Exhibits, dated September 29,1994 and filed October 4,1994, [ROA pgs.
70 to 86].
{7)

The plaintiffs further filed a Affidavit of Victor Ogden in Support of

their Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, filed October 4,
1994, [ROA pgs. 87 to 96].
(8)

On or about October 6, 1994, the Richards and IB Printing filed a

Request for Evidentiary Hearing on the issues before the Trial Court, [ROA pgs. 99 to
100].
(9)

On October 11, 1994, the Ogdens filed a brief Memorandum in

Opposition to Evidentiary Hearing, [ROA pgs. 101 to 103].
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(10)

The Ogdens then filed a Notice to Submit for Decision on October

20, 1995, [ROA pgs. 104 to 105].
(11)

At some point between approximately October 20, 1994 and a

hearing in this matter on December 6, 1994, Judge Rokich was substituted as the Trial
Judge for Judge Fuchs. The Ogdens do not believe that there is any official entry or
notice contained in the record on appeal as to the substitution of Trial Judges, but
believe that both parties were informally notified of this reassignment by the Clerk of the
Court.
(12)

On or about December 6, 1994, Judge Rokich requested a pre-trial

scheduling conference before the Court. This conference was, by stipulation of the
parties, continued to January 3, 1995, [ROA pgs. 108 to 110].
(13)

The Ogdens have determined that no transcript record was made of

the January 3, 1995 pre-trial conference before Judge Rokich. The Ogdens assert that
Judge Rokich briefly heard informal arguments of both parties pertaining to the pending
motions. The Ogdens further assert that Judge Rokich asserted that he would review
the matter and get back to the parties when next in Salt Lake City, and that he would,
most likely, require further argument pertaining to the issues.
(14)

Appellants reasonably believed, from the January 3, 1995 hearing,

that Judge Rokich intended to schedule a further hearing for formal arguments on the
issues.
(15)

The Ogdens next received a Minute Entry entered January 10, 1995

indicating the Court had denied the Richards' and IB's Request for Evidentiary Hearing,
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but had granted the defendants' Motion to Dismiss upon the basis that the defendants'
contacts with Utah were minimal, and that the most convenient forum to hear this case
would be Nevada, [ROA pgs. 111 to 113].
(16)

The Court then had counsel for Richards and IB prepare a formal

Order, which was entered by the Court, on the 8th day of March, 1995. Appellants have
no explanation as to why the Order Affirming the Dismissal was formally entered by the
Court prior to the entry of the Order of Dismissal (February 23, 1995), but assumes that
such was merely a clerical problem of finding, locating and entering the proper Orders
in chronological sequence by the Clerk's office, [ROA pgs. 127 to 128; 129 to 131].
(17)

Promptly after receiving the Minute Entry of Dismissal from Judge

Rokich, counsel for Ogdens elected on January 16, 1995 to file an informal letter petition
requesting the trial judge to reconsider the Minute Entry based upon the assertion by
counsel for Ogdens that the Minute Entry was based upon certain factual errors which
were undisputed and was also premised upon other controverted facts which should
have been construed in favor of the Ogdens. A copy of this informal petition dated
January 16, 1995 and filed with the Court on January 24, 1995 is made a part of the
Record on Appeal, [ROA pgs. 114 to 124].
(18)

The Court, on January 23, 1995, entered a Minute Entry affirming its

earlier decision to dismiss plaintiffs' Complaint, without prejudice, based upon the
allegations that plaintiffs' had apparently participated in an incorporation of the IB
business in Nevada, and that there was a sufficient finding that the Utah forum was a
forum non conveniens, [ROA pg. 125].

13

(19)

The Minute Entry of the trial judge affirming dismissal was

incorporated in a formal Order Affirming Dismissal signed and entered by the Court on
February 23, 1995, [ROA pgs. 126 to 128 ].
(20)

The Ogdens then perfected and filed of record with this Court, a

Notice of Appeal on March 16, 1995 and accompanied by a Notice of Filing Cost Bond
on Appeal, [ROA pgs. 132 to 145].
(21)

The Ogdens then perfected and filed with the above Court a Motion

for Summary Disposition on or about April 14, 1995, (Appellate Court Records).
(22)

This Court then issued an Order on March 31,1995 deferring a ruling

on Appellants Motion for Summary Disposition and requesting the parties to proceed
with the briefing of issues, (Appellate Court Record).
C.

Disposition by the Court.
The foregoing statement of Course of Proceedings outlines all of the

material procedures and judicial facts in this case. At no time was there ever any hearing
or trial of the issues. The Court ultimately entered a final Order of Dismissal from which
an Appeal was properly perfected, as outlined above.
D.

Relevant Facts.
(1)

The Ogdens contend that in September through October of 1993,

they discussed and initiated a joint venture or contract arrangement with various
members of the Richards family, who are named as the defendants/appellees in this
action, to establish a printing business and outlet in the City of Wendover, County of
Tooele, State of Utah, to be known as "IB Printing". IB Printing then engaged in an active
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printing business in Utah from approximately the latter part of 1993 up to and
approximately March or April of 1994. During all of this period, the Ogdens were and
remained Utah residents.

See attached Affidavit of Victor Ogden in Opposition to

Defendants Motion to Dismiss ("Aff. O.") H's 1, 4 and 28 - [ROA pgs. 95 to 96 and 89].
(2)

The Ogdens contend that the initial determination by all parties was

that the IB Printing business would be set-up in Tooele County, Utah and that initial
discussion centered around the actual printing business being a Utah business entity.
Aff. O. If 5 - [ROApg. 95].
(3)

The Ogdens maintain that a leasehold for the printing business was

obtained in the City of Wendover, Utah and IB obtained a business license from the City
of Wendover, State of Utah, for the operation of the IB Printing business. Aff. O. Tf's 6
& 13- [ROA pgs. 93 to 95].
(4)

The Ogdens invested approximately Thirty Thousand Dollars

($30,000.00) in all aspects of the start-up of the IB business, primarily through the
contribution of printing equipment, financed for purchase by the Ogdens, as well as
improvements to the leasehold.

In all events, the Ogdens were the sole capital

contributors to the initial business up to, and including, the initiation of litigation in this
matter. Aff. O. U's 9 & 10 - [ROA pg. 94].
(5)

The Ogdens maintain their understanding of the contractual

relationship with the Richards family was that the Ogdens would retain ownership in all
of the contributed capital and equipment of the IB Printing business until they were
repaid for such contribution after the first year of operations. Thereafter, the Ogdens
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contend that they understood they would own a twenty five percent (25%) residual
interest in the IB Printing business and they would provide continuing consulting as
needed. Aff. O. If 15 - [ROA pg. 93]. See particularly Exhibit A attached to the Ogden
Affidavit as the only extent writing proffered by the Richards. [ROA pg. 87].
(6)

The Ogdens maintain that at no time incident to the start-up of the

joint venture business was there any discussion about the formation of a Nevada
corporation to operate the business, nor the placement of the printing business within
the State of Nevada. It was discussed and agreed that the products of the business
would primarily be sold as advertising supplements to casinos located in Wendover,
Nevada, but that the business would be operated from its original site selection and
leasehold in Wendover, Utah. Aff. O. U's 16, 28 & 29 - [ROA pgs. 89 to 93].
(7)

The Ogdens admit that in approximately February 1994, a Nevada

corporation by the name of IB Printing, Inc. was formed to conduct the day to day
business of the printing operation. The Ogdens maintain that they understood such
Nevada corporation, as suggested and promoted by the Richards family, was merely to
be an operating entity to conduct day-to-day affairs and operations of the IB Printing
business; but, at no time, was it suggested, implied, recommended or understood that
such entity would "own" the business assets or substitute itself for the contract or
partnership relationship of the parties as to the division and return of the original capital
as previously agreed. Aff. O. U's 18 - 20 - [ROA pgs. 91 to 92].
(8)

At no time did the Ogdens ever agree to the transfer of their capital,

assets or contributions to IB Printing, Inc. as the "operating corporation" which was
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formed, nor have the Ogdens ever consented to the removal of such capital assets from
the jurisdiction to the State of Nevada as currently occurred. Aff. O. 11's 7 & 14, ibid H's
1 8 - 2 0 - [ROApgs. 91 to 92].
(9)

Victor Ogden admits, based upon the foregoing factual recitals, that

he was to be named as a director of the Nevada corporation, but did not become a
shareholder, nor did he ever have any understanding that he would be an active officer
or engage in any day-to-day management of such corporate entity, the same was to be
handled by the Richards family, pursuant to prior agreement, as the active
managers/operators of the IB Printing business. Aff. O. H's 19 & 20 - [ROA pgs. 91 to
92].
(10)

The Ogdens now contend that the IB Printing corporation was never

properly organized. Victor Ogden, as a member of the board, had no involvement in any
Organizational Meetings, nor was ever presented with any Organizational Minutes for
review or signature, nor did there ever occur any proposal, to his knowledge, to transfer
the capital assets of IB Printing to the corporation upon any terms. Aff. O. If 7, 22, 23
& 26 - [ROA pgs. 90 to 91 and 95].
(11)

By early May 1994, the Ogdens and the Richards were unable to

resolve their growing differences over what the Ogdens characterized as the failure to
conduct the printing business in a workmanlike and proper manner, the alleged failure
of the Richards to provide any accounting concerning the proper return of capital
contributions, and a growing concern that the Richards would not honor the earlier
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agreement and resolution between the parties as to the return of capital and interest.
Aff. O. H 2 7 - [ROApg. 90].
(12)

The Ogdens contend that all investments, improvements and other

business dealings related to the formation and initiation of the printing activities of IB
occurred exclusively in Wendover, Utah. Aff. O. 11 29 - [ROA pg. 29].
(13)

The Ogdens were informed by the Richards that they were moving

the IB Printing equipment and business with or without the consent of the appellants, to
a Nevada site in Wendover, Nevada in approximately May of 1994.

See plaintiffs'

Complaint U's 31 & 32 and Affidavit of Gary Richards H 8 in which he admitted moving
the equipment to Wendover, Nevada in May of 1994 - [ROA pgs. 13 and 14 as to
Plaintiffs' Complaint; and pg. 67 as to Affidavit of Gary Richards].
(14)

The Ogdens attempted to negotiate some form of settlement from

May into late July of 1994 after retaining the services of their present legal counsel, but
were unable to effect any settlement. A final settlement meeting occurred between the
parties at the Richards home in Wendover, Nevada in late July 1994.

No record

reflecting such negotiations or meetings are on file.
(15)

The Ogdens then made the decision, based upon the Richards'

statements, that the Richards were not going to return the capital equipment and that it
was necessary for them to proceed with the present litigation. At or about this time the
Richards also indicated to the Ogdens their intent to potentially proceed with litigation
to resolve the differences of the parties.

No part of the record would affirm these

discussions between the parties in July 1994.
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(16)

On or about August 18, 1994, the Ogdens were served with a

Complaint filed by the Richards family and IB Printing in the Fourth Judicial District Court
of the State of Nevada in and for Elko County alleging inter alia that Victor Ogden had
breached the agreement to go forward with the corporation and caused other damages
to IB Printing and the Richards family in the amount of approximately $10,000.00, or as
otherwise proven. This action was styled as Gary Richards, Michelle Richards, Donald
D. Richards, Mary Richards and IB Printing, Inc. v. Victor Ogden and was filed on or
about July 27, 1994. A true and correct copy of this Nevada action is attached hereto
and incorporated by this reference as part of the Addendum. See also, Memorandum
of Appellants in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss H 18 - [ROA pg. 81].
(17)

Concurrently to the foregoing proceeding, Victor Ogden was

proceeding forward with the preparation of the filing of his own Complaint (of record in
this proceeding) against the Richards family in Tooele County, Utah. This Complaint was
filed on August 5, 1994. Service of this complaint was completed upon the defendants
on August 12, 1994 in Elko County, City of Wendover, State of Nevada. See Complaint
of plaintiffs' and Return of Service - [ROA pgs. 1 to 20 for Complaint and pgs. 40 through
48 for Returns of Service].
(18)

On September 23, 1994 the Richards family and IB Printing, through

their present counsel of record, filed a Motion to dismiss the Ogdens' action in the Third
District Court in and for Tooele County, Utah - [ROA pgs. 49 to 50].
(19)

The Ogdens have not filed to date a responsive pleading to the

Complaint pending in the County of Elko, State of Nevada, based upon an informal
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agreement for a continuance to the defendants to file a responsive pleading in that forum
between Nevada counsel for the Ogdens and Nevada counsel for the Richards family
and IB Printing, Inc.

The Ogdens would further assert their understanding of the

reasons for the continuance, in part, was that the Richards were going to voluntarily
produce some essential records related to the formation of IB Printing, Inc. which have
never been produced to date. No formal portion of the Record on Appeal reflects this
informal understanding, however, various correspondence between counsel upon which
this understanding was based are incorporated as part of the Addendum.
(20)

The Ogdens would contest the jurisdictions of the State of Nevada

over them incident to their relations with the Richards family. This assertion is stated by
appellants herein as a jurisdictional fact.
(21)

Under the preceding Statement of the Case, the Ogdens have set-out

with particularity the treatment of the Motion to Dismiss filed by the Richards family within
the State of Utah, the apparent underlying rationale of the Court in reaching its decision
to Dismiss, and the other facts surrounding the Dismissal and subsequent perfection of
this appeal. The Ogdens incorporate, by this reference, these prior references and
citations to the Record on Appeal from the Statement of the Case.
(22)

The Ogdens do not believe that the formal Order of Dismissal or

Order Affirming Dismissal essentially adds any material to the Minute Entries and the
same are not attached as an Addendum, but constitute part of the Record on Appeal,
as previously cited.
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(23)

As previously stated, no transcript of any proceeding before the

Court was maintained. The Ogdens believe that the foregoing fully and adequately sets
out the relevant facts pertaining to this proceeding.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Ogdens will argue, and support more particularity below, the following
essential errors they believe were committed by the trial court in dismissing their pending
action against the Richards and IB Printing:
(1)

The trial court first errored by failing to consider in its decision process the

material factual issues presented by the pleadings and the Affidavits of the parties. Any
fair reading of these materials should have shown a prima facia basis for the exercise of
jurisdiction over the defendants because of their significant contacts with the forum State
of Utah. The trial court was required to apply a standard in the dismissal of an action
wherein it should have indulged all disputed material factual issues in favor of the parties
being moved against, the Ogdens. In point of fact, the Ogdens believe the record will
substantiate that the trial court not only did not construe disputed material facts in favor
of the Ogdens, but failed to recognize and weigh any material facts pertaining to the
jurisdictional issues.
(2)

The trial court committed reversible and manifest error by reaching

conclusions in its memorandum decision dismissing plaintiffs' complaint which were, in
some instances, in conflict with the undisputed facts before the Court; and, in other
instances, failed to properly recite disputed issues of fact in favor of the party being
moved against, the Ogdens.
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(3)

Even if the trial court were to have properly viewed all of the evidence, the

defendants have not met the threshold requirements for establishing the basis for a
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT HAD BEFORE IT SUFFICIENT
CREDIBLE FACTS, WHICH ARE DEEMED ADMITTED
PURSUANT TO THE GRANTING OF THE MOTION TO
DISMISS PROCEEDING, TO PRECLUDE A MOTION TO
DISMISS, OR A SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
In the recent case of Ativa v. Salt Lake County. 852 P.2d 1007, 1008 (Ut. App.
1993), the Court reiterated Utah case law that on appeal from a trial court's grant of a
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under URCP, Rule 12, factual
allegations in a plaintiff's complaint must be deemed as true. This Court has further
stated all reasonable inferences drawn from the complaint must be construed in favor of
the party moved against, see Mounteer v. Utah Power and Light Co.. 823 P.2d 1055,
1058 (Utah 1991). Our Court of Appeals in Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds. Inc.. 841
P.2d 742, 744 (Ut. App. 1992) further said such allegations and all reasonable inferences
drawn from them must be "liberally" construed in favor or the Plaintiff.
In the case of Lynn v. Lynch. 665 P.2d 1276,1278 (Utah 1983), this court provided
that in any Motion to Dismiss, based upon Rule 12(b), if matters outside of the pleadings
may be considered by the trial court and are not specifically excluded, then the motion
to dismiss should be treated, in substance, as one for summary judgment. It appears
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this Court in Lynn v. Lynch, supra., was extending this doctrine not only to motions to
dismiss for "failure to state a cause of action" under Rule 12(b)(6), but to other Rule 12(b)
motions as well. See also Thavne v. Beneficial Utah, Inc., supra. 874 P.2d at 124.
Under the summary judgment standards when matters outside the pleadings are
considered in any motion to dismiss both the allegations of the complaint and the
matters outside the pleadings should be construed in a light most favorable to the party
being moved against, as well as all reasonable inferences derived therefrom.
Under the present state of the record, there appears to be a clear showing that
the trial judge did not properly consider material jurisdictional issues which would show,
at least prima facially from the pleadings and the affidavits, that the Richards had
submitted personally and generally to the jurisdiction of the State of Utah. Selectively,
plaintiffs would assert that the following factual issues presented by the complaint and
the affidavit of Victor Ogden were not considered by the Court, or were improperly
stated:
1.

The trial court incorrectly stated in its initial Memorandum Decision that the

IB Printing Company business had its principal place of business within the State of
Nevada. In point of fact, the pleadings and affidavits show that the IB Printing Company
was operated by the consent of the parties exclusively in Wendover, Utah, and the
actual printing business was conducted under such name from approximately November
1993 to early May of 1994 within the State of Utah.
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2.

It also appears undisputed between the parties that most original

organizational efforts for the IB business occurred in the State of Utah, with the physical
location and business lease being situated in Wendover, Utah.
3.

The Court does not further treat appellants' apparently controverted

statement, (but which statement must be assumed in favor of the Ogdens for the
purposes of a motion to dismiss proceeding,) that the IB Printing Corporation, while
organized as a Nevada corporation, was intended only as an operating entity for the
printing business in Utah, and did not receive any transfer of the assets, as contributed
by the Ogdens to the business, nor was it ever intended to modify the original capital
agreement between the parties and was intended solely as an operating entity.
4.

The Court apparently did not review the facts of whether the IB Printing

Corporation was even properly organized, since Victor Olden, as a member of the initial
Board of Directors, states by affidavit that he was not involved in any organizational
meetings or any discussion concerning removal or transfer of assets to the State of
Nevada or to the corporate entity.
5.

The Court gave no consideration to whether the Richards may be acting

adversely and improperly in removing assets to the State of Nevada after disputes arose
with the Ogdens; and, therefore, may have acted inequitably and with "unclean hands"
towards a Utah resident in adversely affecting a Utah business situated within Wendover,
Utah.
Each of these jurisdictional facts should have been considered and imputed to the
Ogdens by the trial court in considering the motion to dismiss. The apparent absence
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of any consideration of these jurisdictional facts, and the apparent misstatement by the
trial court that it felt the IB Printing business was a Nevada business at all times material
to the action, evidences a clearly erroneous factual standard upon which the motion to
dismiss was based.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED MANIFEST AND
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO DISMISS BY APPARENTLY EXCLUDING
FROM ITS CONSIDERATION MATERIAL FACTS, AND BY
MISSTATING OTHER MATERIAL FACTS.
There should be no question that a motion to dismiss, with or without prejudice,
is a final appealable decision denying the plaintiffs their day in Court, or any further
remedy before the trial courts of this state. This Court has long held that dismissal is a
severe measure and should be granted by a trial court only if it is clear that a party is not
entitled to any relief under any stated facts which could be proved in support of its claim.
See Colman v. Utah State Land Bd.. supra.
In the Colman decision, and other cases previously cited, this Court has adopted
the standard that in a motion to dismiss proceeding, it is necessary to indulge the factual
allegations of the complaint as true statements in favor of the party being moved against,
as well as all materials outside of the complaint which may be considered when not
rejected by the trial court. See Lvnn v. Lynch, supra., 665 P.2d at 1278; and St
Benedicts Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hospital, supra.. 811 P.2d at 196.
In this particular case, there was before the Court detailed memorandums with
supporting exhibits submitted by both plaintiffs' and defendants' counsel, as well as
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sworn Affidavits by Mr. Victor Ogden and Mr. Gary Richards. It was incumbent upon the
trial court, unless it made an actual determination to exclude from consideration those
Affidavits and Memorandums, to consider such factual statements in reaching its decision
to dismiss. Facially, even considering the Complaint alone, Plaintiffs clearly established
the Richards not only engaged in business within the State of Utah, but induced and
encouraged Utah residents, Victor and Angie Ogden, to participate with them in a
business located in Tooele County, Utah. This fact alone should be jurisdictional^
sufficient to deny a Motion to Dismiss; either under the doctrine that the defendants had
no material contacts with the State of Utah; or, under the related and collateral equitable
doctrine of forum non conveniens as more fully discussed under the third point, below.
In Demond v. FHP. supra., 849 P.2d at 599, our Appellate Court held that it would
not sustain a Motion to Dismiss if the plaintiffs were entitled to relief under facts alleged
or under any stated facts they could prove to support their claim. It now appears to
plaintiffs, it was manifest and reversible error for the trial court not to indulge the Affidavit
evidence and Memorandum evidence in connection with the statements in the plaintiffs'
pleadings to clearly show that a prima facia case for substantial involvement of the
Richards and IB Printing within the State of Utah had been demonstrated as a threshold
matter.
While there is a general paucity of Utah case law dealing of the Doctrine of forum
non conveniens it does appear to be rationally necessary to imply that the same
standards of review and conduct as in other motions to dismiss should be applied in
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considering a dismissal under the forum non conveniens when the end effect (dismissal)
is the same.
Finally, the Ogdens would contend that the failure to consider what is manifestly
evident from the record as legitimate issues pertaining to the trial court's jurisdiction over
the defendants rises to the level of manifest error or abuse of discretion in the trial court's
ruling under Utah Law.
Our Appellate Court has repeatedly held that it is not bound by the trial court's
determination of either fact or law in reviewing a motion to dismiss treated as a summary
judgment, Canfield v. Albertsons. Inc.. 841 P.2d 1224, 1226 (Ut. App. 1992).

The

standard of review by this court is the "correctness standard", that is the trial court's
decision should be afforded no presumption of validity or deterrence but this Court
should determine the correctness of the ruling de novo from the record before it. See
also Hansen v. Department of Financial Institutions, 858 P.2d 184, 186 (Ut. App. 1993);
St. Benedicts, supra. 811 P.2d 196.
POINT III
THE COURT ERRORED IN THE LEGAL APPLICATION OF
THE FORUM NON CONVENIENS DOCTRINE IN
DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT.
As previously cited to this Court, the case of Colman v. Utah State Land Bd.,
supra., 795 P.2d at 622, 624, clearly stands for the proposition that dismissal is not a
favored remedy and should be granted only when there are not any facts which would
preclude the granting of such a motion.
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Assuming, for the purposes of argument only, that the trial court did fully consider
the allegations of the Ogdens that the defendants had technically submitted themselves
to the general jurisdiction of the courts of the State of Utah; this Court is still faced with
an apparent first impression dilemma of whether, in a case showing prima facia
jurisdiction over defendants, there remains an independent basis for dismissal under the
doctrine of forum non conveniens.
Appellants are at a loss to determine, lacking a clear and explicit statement by the
trial court, whether the trial court believed personal jurisdiction had been shown to exist,
but otherwise dismissed barred upon the equitable doctrine of dismissal pursuant to the
forum non conveniens doctrine; or whether the court believed it lacked jurisdiction over
the Richards under any application of the facts.
In Utah, there is scant case authority explaining or applying the doctrine of forum
non conveniens. To the knowledge of the Ogdens and their counsel, there is no Utah
case authority treating the potential interface and relationship of the doctrine of personal
jurisdiction over non-resident defendants (either pursuant to general or long arm
jurisdiction) with dismissal standards under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
The most recent and probably only substantive case law within the State of Utah
dealing with the doctrine of forum non conveniens was the 1977 case of Summa Corp.
v. Lancer Industries, Inc., supra. 559 P.2d at 546 in which this Court held that the
equitable doctrine of forum non conveniens is not based upon any statute or rule. The
doctrine, as then enunciated, apparently held an action may be dismissed as to a nonresident in select circumstances, even if jurisdiction is otherwise appropriate.
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Factors considered included (i) location of the primary parties, (ii) where the
claim/facts arose, (iii) ease of access to proof, (iv) enforceability, and (v) consideration
of burdens placed upon the court and the parties. The apparent standard is that when
the forum is inconvenient to a defendant, when the dismissal would not impose
unreasonable or undue hardship upon the plaintiffs, when another forum exists, and
when there are no prevailing equities or doctrines which would mandate that the matter
continue to be heard by the forum court, then dismissal may be considered.
In discussing this doctrine, this Court clearly held in the Summa case, supra., that
the doctrine should be applied only with "great caution" and under "compelling
circumstances".
Analytically, this Court is first confronted with the problem of whether the forum
non conveniens doctrine would generally have any application to a situation in which a
defendant may have submitted to the general jurisdictions of the courts of Utah by
systematically conducting business in this state.

Again, returning to the factual

allegations of the Ogdens' complaint, the Ogdens have clearly demonstrated a prima
facia showing that the Richards family participated actively with the Ogdens in leasing
property for the operation for the IB Printing business in Tooele County, and started up
and conducted business with the Ogdens in Tooele County from late 1993 until the
Spring of 1994.
Equitably, the question may be stated: can a party who knowingly and willfully
submits to general jurisdiction in Utah through the conduct of business within this state,
subsequently be entitled to raise a defense of forum non conveniens when problems
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arise with a Utah participant in that business? The Ogdens answer would simply be that
under these circumstances, general jurisdiction should clearly preclude the subsequent
application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
Again, the Ogdens are not aware of any specific Utah holding which has treated
the potential interface between an allegation and showing of general personal jurisdiction
with the application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
This Court may find helpful, in considering this issue, the Washington Appellate
Court case of Wolf v. Boeing Company, 810 P.2d 943, 946 (Wash. App. 1991) wherein
that Court considered a factual situation in which the estates of passengers killed in an
airplane crash in Mexico brought a products liability action against the aircraft
manufacturer (Boeing) in Washington. The Appellate Court of Washington upheld the
trial court's determination that the action could appropriately be dismissed under forum
non conveniens in that Mexico provided a more convenient and adequate forum for the
hearing of the claims, particularly since most of the plaintiffs were Mexican nationals.
The Ogdens believe that the Wolf v. Boeing case, supra., may be helpful to this Court,
not only because it is a generally good summary of recent applicable law on forum non
conveniens, but because the standards that Court applied are clearly distinguishable and
mostly non-existent in the present factual situation. Essentially, the Court relied upon the
following jurisdictional facts in finding that the Courts of the Nation of Mexico would be
a more appropriate forum, none of which are believed to be extant in the present
proceeding:
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1.

Almost all of the plaintiffs were Mexican nationals and had no contact with

the State of Washington other than the misfortune to have perished in an aircraft which
was built in a Boeing Plant located within the State of Washington. By contrast, in the
present situation, we believe that any reasonable construction of the pleadings and
proffered affidavit facts in this case show that the Richards entered into negotiations and
discussion with the Ogdens in Utah for the formation of a Utah printing business, that
there was an agreement to locate the business initially within the State of Utah, and, in
fact, both parties, as well as the resulting IB Printing business, continued to conduct
printing business within the State of Utah.
2.

Access to witnesses and other evidence would be more easily located

within the Nation of Mexico. In this case, substantial evidence may be located in both
the State of Utah and the State of Nevada, but it is uncontroverted that all of the original
organizational negotiations and documentation for the establishment of the IB Printing
business occurred within the State of Utah and that various supporting documents, such
as the Tooele County lease, would be located in the City of Tooele, State of Utah.
Moreover, the initial accountant for the business resides in Salt Lake City, Utah.
3.

Convenience to parties in attending proceedings.

In our case, the

inconvenience of the parties is somewhat equally divided. If this case is to proceed in
Tooele, Utah, some of the Richards family would be compelled to travel a distance of
approximately 100 miles from Wendover, Nevada to Tooele, Utah. If the action was to
proceed in the District Courts of Elko, Nevada, the Ogdens would be compelled to travel
a distance of over 220 miles to attend proceedings in Elko, Nevada.
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4.

The Court in Wolf v. Boeing also looked at the substantial interest of Mexico

in protecting its citizens involved in injurious harm within its own jurisdiction and applying
its own safety standards and process to such accidents. In this case, by contrast, the
Ogdens would assert that there is a strong interest for the State of Utah to continue
regulation of a business dispute over non-resident defendants, when those defendants
knowingly and actively participated within the State of Utah in the initiation of a business
derived income within the State of Utah from the operation of such business, and
arguably inflicted harm on the Ogdens as Utah residents. Moreover, there is a further
State interest in protecting the Ogdens who entered into a business relationship within
the State of Utah and have what is believed to be a legitimate claim to the protection of
the laws of the State of Utah and access to its courts for the resolution of disputes
arising out of Utah business activities.
5.

Finally, the Court considered the relative congestion of the court systems

as a legitimate public policy factor. Fortunately, in our case, both Utah and Nevada
Courts are generally considered to be blessed with having among the least congested
calendars within the United States and this factor should not be considered as an issue.
Even if this Court were to determine that there has not been & prima facia showing
by the Ogdens that the Richards family engaged in activities submitting them to a
general jurisdiction within the State of Utah, there clearly is the secondary and collateral
argument that the Richards, at one time or another, submitted to jurisdiction in Utah
under the Long Arm Statute UCA §78-27-24.

32

The provisions of UCA §78-27-24 set out the basis by which non-resident
defendants can submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the Courts of the State of Utah
through the conduct of certain specified activities:
"Any person, notwithstanding Section 16-101-1501, whether or not a citizen
or resident of this state, who in person or through an agent does any of the
following enumerated acts, submits himself, and if an individual, his
personal representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to
any claim arising from:
1.

the transaction of any business within this state;

2.

contracting to supply services or goods in this state;

3.
the causing of any injury within this state whether tortious or by breach of
warranty;
4.

the ownership, use or possession of any real estate situated in this state;

5.
contracting to insure any person, property or risk located within this state
at the time of contracting;
6.
with respect to actions of divorce, separate maintenance, or child support,
having resided, in the marital relationship, within this state notwithstanding
subsequent departure from the state; or the commission in this state of the act
giving rise to the claim, so long as that act is not a mere omission, failure to act,
or occurrence over which the defendant had no control; or
7.
the commission of sexual intercourse within this state which gives rise to
a paternity suit under Title 78, Chapter 45e, to determine paternity for the purpose
of establishing responsibility of child support."
This Court has consistently held the legislative policy and purpose underlying the
Utah Long Arm Statute was to extend jurisdiction over non-resident defendants to the
maximum extent possible consistent with the due process clause of the U. S.
Constitution, including general principles of equity and fairness to protect the interest of
Utah citizens, such as the Ogdens.

See Mallorv Engineering v. Ted R. Brown and
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Associates, 618 P.2d 1004, 1006, F.N.4 (Utah 1980); Kamdar & Company v. Larav Co.,
815 P.2d 245, 249 (Ut. App. 1991). It seems apparent the Ogdens have established a
prima facia showing that the Richards have engaged in "specific acts" under
subparagraphs 1, 3, & 4 of UCA §78-27-24, even absent a showing of general
jurisdiction.
It would appear to the Ogdens to be a matter of first impression before this Court
as to the potential resolution of the interface of the public policy arguments in favor of
extending the Utah Long Arm Statute to non-resident defendants having sufficient
minimal contacts within the forum jurisdiction to the maximum extent permissible, versus
policy considerations that may be extent in the application of the doctrine of forum non
conveniens.
Because there is no specific case law on this point, the Ogdens would argue that
the general legislative policy behind the Utah Long Arm Statute should control and be
given primary application to hold that a non-resident defendant is subject to the
jurisdiction of the State of Utah and that an action should not be dismissed under the
doctrine of forum non conveniens in most instances where the long arm

threshold

requirements have been demonstrated showing sufficient minimal contacts for the
exercise of jurisdiction.
In shorthand fashion, where the defendant has availed himself or herself of the
forum state to the extent that Long Arm Jurisdiction may be found, such defendant
should concurrently be precluded from raising factors that such forum is an inconvenient
forum for the resolution of related conflicts. In this case, there would appear to be no
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extreme or unusual circumstances which would preclude the general application of the
foregoing proposed principle, i.e. this Court should find, because of either general
jurisdiction or Utah Long Arm jurisdiction, there would be no dismissal under the doctrine
of forum non conveniens.
Various foreign jurisdictions which have considered this issue have held that the
doctrine of forum non conveniens should have no application where either general
personal jurisdiction, or jurisdiction under the equitable standards of their respective
Long Arm Statues, have been established over a party.

See Jones v. Searle

Laboratories, N.E.2d 917, 920 - 921 (III. App. 1981); Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Co.
v. Swain, 362 S.2d 17, 18 (Fla. 1978); Chapman v. Southern Railway Co., 95 S.E.2d 170,
172-173 (S.C. 1956).
Additionally, would not the older equitable standards applied in utilizing the forum
non conveniens doctrine be subsumed and satisfied in the "equitable balancing" required
by this Court in applying long arm jurisdiction to insure substantial justice and fair play;
see discussion of equitable balancing in Kamdar & Co. v. Laray Co. Inc., supra. 815 P.2d
245, 249-250, and Anderson v. American Society of Plastic Surgeons, 807 P.2d 825, 828
(Utah 1990).
CONCLUSION
The Ogdens believe that they have amply demonstrated to this Court that the trial
court abused its discretion in failing to properly recognize or entertain evidence from the
pleadings and affidavits before the court which should have been construed in favor of
the Ogdens and considered by the Court in weighing the motion to dismiss.
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The

apparent failure of the Court to consider all disputed evidence in favor of the Ogdens,
in and of itself and without further consideration of policy issues, should persuade to this
Court to reverse the trial court's order of dismissal and mandate remanding the
proceeding back to the trial court for further determination upon the merits. Alternatively,
and only in the event that this Court does not agree with the foregoing premise, the
Ogdens further argue that under a doctrinal application of forum non conveniens there
is still not any showing of a basis for dismissal of this case on the merits.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ k a y of July, 1995.

. Jense
for Appellants/Plaintiffs
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78-27-22

JUDICIAL CODE
COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. — 36 Am. Jur. 2d Foreign Corporations § 538.
C.J.S. — 20 C J.S. Corporations § 1943; 72
CJ.S. Process § 31.

Key Numbers. — Corporations «=» 668; Process *=» 62.

78-27-22. Jurisdiction over nonresidents — Purpose of
provision.
It is declared, as a matter of legislative determination, that the public
interest demands the state provide its citizens with an effective means of
redress against nonresident persons, who, through certain significant minimal contacts with this state, incur obligations to citizens entitled to the state's
protection. This legislative action is deemed necessary because of technological progress which has substantially increased the flow of commerce between
the several states resulting in increased interaction between persons of this
state and persons of other states.
The provisions of this act, to ensure maximum protection to citizens of this
state, should be applied so as to assert jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the fullest extent permitted by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
History: L. 1969, ch. 246, § 1.
Meaning of "this act" — The term "this
act," in the second paragraph, means Laws
1969, Chapter 246, which appears as
§§ 78-27-22 to 78-27-28.
Cross-References. — Foreign corporations,
registered office and agent, §§ 16-10-109 to
16-10-111.

Foreign fraternals, service of process upon
commissioner, § 31 A-14-203.
Nonresident motorists, long-arm provision,
§ 41-12a-403.
Service of process, Rules of Civil Procedure,
Role 4.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
able to nonresident plaintiffs since § 78-27-24
neither expressly nor by implication precludes
nonresidents who have a permit to do business
in Utah from obtaining jurisdiction by longarm service. Hughes Tool Co. v. Meier, 486
F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1973).

ANALYSIS

Implementation.
Nonresident plaintiffs.
Special appearance.
Cited.
Implementation.
The courts have the responsibility to protect
Utah citizens from suits in other states unless
they have engaged in some conduct or activity
there beyond mere presence, and to afford the
citizens of other states the same protection in
the courts of Utah. Union Ski Co. v. Union
Plastics Corp., 548 P.2d 1257 (Utah 1976).
Nonresident plaintiffs.
Language of this section indicating purpose
of legislature in enacting long-arm statute was
to protect citizens of the state does not render
remedy afforded by long-arm statute unavail-

Special appearance.
Where defendant, an out-of-state corporation
not licensed to do business in Utah, appeared
and moved to discharge writ of attachment on
ground that it was improperly issued, the appearance was not general since there was no
request for any affirmative relief, and the court
did not obtain personal jurisdiction over the
movant by virtue of it. Ted R. Brown & Assocs.
v. Carnes Corp., 547 P.2d 206 (Utah 1976).
Cited in Lister v. Marangoni Meccanica, 728
F. Supp. 1524 (D. Utah 1990); DeMoss v. City
MfcL, Inc, 762 F. Supp. 913 (D. Utah 1991).
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MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

78-27-24

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — In Personam Jurisdiction Expanded: Utah's Long Arm Statute,
1970 Utah L. Rev. 222.
I Note, Parry v. Ernst Home Center Corporaition: The "Mauling" of Personal Jurisdiction
hTheory, 1990 Utah L. Rev. 479.
• Brigham Young Law Review. — Mini-

mum Contacts in Single Contract Cases:
Burger King Has Its Way, 1986 B.Y.U. L. Rev.
505.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts
§ 146.
C.J.S. — 21 CJ.S. Courts § 39 et seq.
Key Numbers. — Courts *» 10 et seq.

78-27-23. Jurisdiction over nonresidents — Definitions.
As used in this act:
(1) The words "any person" mean any individual,firm,company, association, or corporation.
(2) The words "transaction of business within this state" mean activities of a nonresident person, his agents, or representatives in this state
which affect persons or businesses within the state of Utah.
History: L. 1969, ch. 246, § 2.

MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

78-27-24

CHAPTER 27
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
Section
78-27-24.
78-27-33.
78-27-34.

78-27-37.
78-27-38.
78-27-39.
78-27-40.

Section
Jurisdiction over nonresidents —
Acts submitting person to jurisdiction.
Statement of injured person —
When inadmissible as evidence,
Release, settlement or statement
by injured person — When rescission or disavowal provisions
inapplicable.
Definitions.
Comparative negligence.
Separate special verdicts on total
damages and proportion of
fault.
Amount of liability limited to pro-

78-27-41.
78-27-50.
78-27-52.
78-27-58.
78-27-60.

portion of fault — No contribution.
Joinder of defendants.
Financial information privacy —
Chapter inapplicable to certain
official investigations.
Inherent risks of skiing — Definitions.
Service of judicial process by persons other than law enforcement officers.
Limited immunity for architects
and engineers inspecting earthquake damage.

78-27-15. Salaries of public officers subject to garnishment.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Nonpublic employee,
lax refund.
Nonpublic employee.
This section authorizes the State Tax Commission to comply with a writ of garnishment of
a state tax refund owing to nonpublic employees. Funk v. State Tax Comm'n, 839 R2d 818
(Utah 1992).

earnings for purposes of the Consumer Credit
Protection Act and U.R.C.P. 64D(dXvii), it was
not subject to the limitations on garnishment
contained in those provisions; a bank that obtained a judgment against plaintiff properly
obtained a writ of garnishment that directed
the Utah State Tax Commission to attach
plaintiff's state tax refund. Funk v. State Tax
Comm'n, 839 P.2d 818 (Utah 1992).

Tax refund.
Since a state tax refund was not disposable

78-27-24. Jurisdiction over nonresidents — Acts submitting person to jurisdiction*
Any person, notwithstanding Section 16-10a-1501, whether or not a citizen
or resident of this state, who in person or through an agent does any of the
following enumerated acts, submits himself, and if an individual, his personal
representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to any claim
arising from:
(1) the transaction of any business within this state;
(2) contracting to supply services or goods in this state;
(3) the causing of any injury within this state whether tortious or by
breach of warranty;
(4) the ownership, use, or possession of any real estate situated in this
state;
(5) contracting to insure any person, property, or risk located within
this state at the time of contracting;
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78-27-33

JUDICIAL CODE

(6) with respect to actions of divorce, separate maintenance, or child
support, having resided, in the marital relationship, within this state
notwithstanding subsequent departure from the state; or the commission
in this state of the act giving rise to the claim, so long as that act is not a
mere omission, failure to act, or occurrence over which the defendant had
no control; or
(7) the commission of sexual intercourse within this state which gives
rise to a paternity suit under Title 78, Chapter 45a, to determine paternity
for the purpose of establishing responsibility for child support.
History: L. 1969, ch. 246, § 3; 1983, ch.
160, § 1; 1987, ch. 35, § 1; 1992, ch. 277,
§ 247.
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend-

ment, effective July 1, 1992, substituted "Section 16-10a-1501w for "Section 16-10-102" in the
introductory paragraph.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Nonresident defendants.
—Auto dealer.
Transaction of any business.
—Minimal contacts.
Nonresident defendants.
—Auto dealer.
Texas auto dealer's intentional misrepresentation of mileage on a truck eventually sold in
Utah brought the dealer under Subsection (3)
of this section, but exercise of jurisdiction was
nevertheless improper because dealer's contacts with state were not sufficient to satisfy
due process requirements. Clements v. Tbmball
Ford, Inc., 812 R Supp. 202 (D. Utah 1993).
Transaction of any business.

representative to Utah did not establish sufficient minimum contacts for the assertion of
specific personal jurisdiction where its contacts
in Utah were wholly unrelated to the cause of
action asserted against it. Arguello v. Industrial
Wood-working Mach. Co., 838 P.2d 1120 (Utah
1992).
A Texas manufacturer could not have reasonably anticipated being brought into court in
Utah when it sold no finger jointing machines
in Utah and it did not seek to serve the Utah
market for finger jointing machines through
either sales representatives or advertising; the
machine that was the subject of plaintiffs suit
was sold to an ultimate buyer in California and
resale of the machine in Utah was wholly
unforeseeable. Arguello v. Industrial Woodworking Mach. Co., 838 P.2d 1120 (Utah 1992).

—Minimal contacts.
A Texas manufacturer's sending a service

78-27-33. Statement of injured person
sible as evidence.

When inadmis-

Except as otherwise provided in this act, any statement, either written or
oral, obtained from an injured person within 15 days of an occurrence or while
this person is confined in a hospital or sanitarium as a result of injuries
sustained in the occurrence, and which statement is obtained by a person
whose interest is adverse or may become adverse to the injured person, except
a law enforcement officer, shall not be admissible as evidence in any civil
proceeding brought by or against the injured person for damages sustained as
a result of the occurrence, unless:
(1) a written verbatim copy of the statement has been left with the
injured party at the time the statement was taken; and
(2) the statement has not been disavowed in writing within fifteen days
of the date of the statement or within fifteen days after the date of the
injured person's initial discharge from the hospital or sanitarium in which
the person has been confined, whichever date is later.
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Rule 12

Rule 12. Defenses and objections.
(a) When presented. A defendant shall serve his answer within twenty
days after the service of the summons and complaint is complete unless otherwise expressly provided by statute or order of the court. A party served with a
pleading stating a cross-claim against him shall serve an answer thereto
within twenty days after the service upon him. The plaintiff shall serve his
reply to a counterclaim in the answer within twenty days after service of the
answer or, if a reply is ordered by the court, within twenty days after service
of the order, unless the order otherwise directs. The service of a motion under
this rule alters these periods of time as follows, unless a different time is fixed
by order of the court:
(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition until the
trial on the merits, the responsive pleading shall be served within ten
days after notice of the court's action;
(2) If the court grants a motion for a more definite statement, the
responsive pleading shall be served within ten days after the service of
the more definite statement.
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim,
shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except
that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by
motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction
over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of service of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, (7) failure to join an indispensable party. A motion making any of
these defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted. No defense or objection is waived by being joined with one or more other
defenses or objections in a responsive pleading or motion or by further pleading after the denial of such motion or objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim
for relief to which the adverse party is not required to serve a responsive
pleading, he may assert at the trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for
relief. If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure
of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters
outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as
provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
\ (c) Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After the pleadings are closed
but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters
outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as
provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
(d) Preliminary hearings. The defenses specifically enumerated (l)-(7) in
subdivision (b) of this rule, whether made in a pleading or by motion, and the
motion for judgment mentioned in subdivision (c) of this rule shall be heard
and determined before trial on application of any party, unless the court
orders that the hearings and determination thereof be deferred until the trial.
(e) Motion for more definite statement If a pleading to which a responsive pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot
reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading, he may move for a
more definite statement before interposing his responsive pleading. The motion shall point out the defects complained of and the details desired. If the
motion is granted and the order of the court is not obeyed within ten days
after notice of the order or within such other time as the court may fix, the
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fault judgment where notice is required only
by custom, 28 AX.R.3d 1383.
Failure of party or his attorney to appear at
pretrial conference, 55 A.L.R.3d 303.

Rule 56

Default judgments against the United States
under Rule 55(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 55 A.L.R. Fed. 190.
Key Numbers. — Judgment •» 92 to 134.

Rule 56. Summary judgment
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any
part thereof.
(b) For defending party, A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time,
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his
favor as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a
genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a
triad is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It
Bhall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or
ather relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be
leemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supportng and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set
brth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmaively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidait shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidaits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories,
r further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and
upported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the
lere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or
s otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that
iere is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgtent, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits
?
a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by
Edavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the
^plication for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be
stained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such
her order as is just.
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of
£ court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule
* presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall
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forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the aflBdavits caused
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 56, F.R.C.P.

Cross-References. — Contempt generally,
§ 78-7-18, 78-32-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Affidavit.
—Contents.
—Corporation.
—Experts,
—Inconsistency with deposition.
—Necessity of opposing affidavits.
Resting on pleadings.
—Objection.
—Sufficiency.
Hearsay and opinion testimony.
—Superseding pleadings.
—Unpleaded defenses.
—Verified pleading.
—Waiver of right to contest.
—When unavailable.
Exclusive control of facts.
—Who may make.
Affirmative defense.
Answers to interrogatories.
Appeal.
—Adversely affected party.
—Standard of review.
Attorney's fees.
Availability of motion.
Compliance with rule.
Cross-motions.
Damages.
Discovery.
Disputed facts.
Evidence.
—Facts considered.
—Improper evidence.
—Proof.
—Weight of testimony.
Implicit rulings.
Improper party plaintiff.
Issue of fact.
—Contract interpretation.
—Corporate existence.
—Deeds.
—Lease as security.
—Notice.
Judicial attitude.
Motion for new trial.
Motion to dismiss.
Motion to reconsider.
Notice.
—Provision not jurisdictional.
—Waiver of defect.
Procedural due process.
Purpose.
Scope.
Summary judgment improper.
—Damage to insured vehicle.
—Dispersal of interest.
—Findings by court.
—Foreclosure of trust deeds.
—Fraud or duress.
—Guardianship.

—Mortgage note.
—Negligence.
—Nonspecific denial of requests for admission.
—Note.
—Recovery for goods and services.
—Stock ownership.
—Wrongful possession.
Summary judgment proper.
—Contract action.
—Contract terms.
—Deceit.
—Jurisdiction.
—Negligence.
—Res ipsa loquitur.
Time for motion.
Written statement of grounds.
Cited.
Affidavit
—Contents.
Specific facts are required to show whetl
there is genuine issue for trial. Reagan
door Adv., Inc. v. Lundgren, 692 P.2d 778
(Utah 1984).
When a motion for summary judgment^
made under this rule, the affidavit of an 1
verse party must contain specific evidentia
facts showing that there is a genuine issue i
trial. Treloggan v. Treloggan, 699 P.2d
(Utah 1985).
Affidavits submitted by plaintiff that •
tained opinion, legal conclusions, and facts;
supported by adequate foundation but ]
of which complied with Subdivision (e),\
cause the objectionable statements did notl
more than supplement the arguments madeQ
plaintiffs memorandum, did not prejudic^j
fendants. Broadwater v. Old Republic Sur.}
P.2d 527 (Utah 1993).
—Corporation.
Where an affidavit is made by an oflfic
corporation, it is generally considered to I
affidavit of the corporation itself. Howe
personal knowledge of an agent of the <
tion who is not a corporate officer
the facts to which he has sworn will |
not be presumed, and therefore, the ^
"means and sources'* of his information sj
be shown. Utah Farm Prod. Credit / '
Watts, 737 P.2d 154 (Utah 1987). SJ
—Experts.
Utah Rule of Evidence 704 allows thej
to state his opinion concerning the
issue in the case, and an expert affidav
also contain a sufficient factual basis j
opinion proffered. Thus, the affidavit i
cient if it articulates the facts upon wh
opinion was based and if the facts '
"type usually relied upon by expertsK
field/' Gaw v. State, 798 P.2d 1130 r
App. 1990).
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FILED 5V.
IN THE

THIRD DISTRICT COURT

TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY

OGDEN, VICTOR
PLAINTIFF
VS
IB PRINT COMPANY

CASE NUMBER 940300038 CN
DATE 01/09/95
HONORABLE JOHN A. ROKICH
COURT REPORTER
COURT CLERK RGB

DEFENDANT
TYPE OF HEARING:
PRESENT:
P. ATTY. JENSEN, JULIAN D
D. ATTY. LUDLOW, RANDY S

DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING IS DENIED.
THE COURT GRANTS DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS BECAUSE
DEFENDANT'S CONTACT WITH UTAH WERE MINIMAL AND THE MOST
CONVENIENT FORUM TO HEAR THIS CASE IS IN NEVADA. THE UNDISPUTED
FACTS ARE THAT THE BUSINESS WAS INCORPORATED IN THE STATE OF
NEVADA WITH IT'S PRINCIPAL PLACE OF BUSINESS BEING WENDOVER NEV.
THE PURPOSE OF THE BUSINESS WAS TO PROVIDE PRINTING FOR THE
CASINOS IN WENDOVER, NEVADA. THE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS WERE
NEVADA RESIDENTS EXCEPT FOR PLAINTIFF.
THE COURT BELIEVES THAT THE MOST CONVENIENT FORUM TO HEAR
THIS MATTER IS IN NEVADA, BECAUSE THIS IS WHERE THE CONTROVERSY
AROSE, THE EASE OF ACCESS TO PROVE OR DISPROVE THE CLAIMS, THE
COSTS INVOLVED, THE AVAILABILITY OF WITESSES AND THE ENFORCEMENT
OF THE JUDGMENT.
THE COURT REFERS THE PARTIES TO DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS WITHOUT
PREJUDICE.
DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL SHALL PREPARE THE ORDER ACCORDINGLY.

DATE^ JAN.9, 1995

n

~

boHW A. ROKICH
THIRD DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

000113

Case No: 940300038 CN
Certificate of Mailing
X certify

th at

on th. _&_

- Y of

0 ^

,

/&£_.

I sent by first class mail a true and correct copy of the
attached document to the following:
RANDY S. LUDOW
Atty for Plaintiff
311 SOUTH STATE STREET
SUITE 280
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111

JULIAN D. JENSEN
Atty for Defendant
311 SOUTH STATE SUITE 380
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111
District Court Cleric

J Deputy'Clerk

nnm 1 'A

95 J:.::-3'.'• z-c
FILED BY
IN THE

THIRD DISTRICT COURT

TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY
OGDEN, VICTOR
PLAINTIFF
VS
IB PRINT COMPANY

CASE NUMBER 940300038 CN
DATE 01/03/95
HONORABLE JOHN A. ROKICH
COURT REPORTER
COURT CLERK RGB

DEFENDANT
TYPE OF HEARING:
PRESENT: PLAINTIFF
STIPULATION
P. ATTY. JENSEN, JULIAN D
D. ATTY.

AN IN-COURT CONFERENCE IS BEFORE THE COURT. AN ORDER ON THE
DENIAL OF THE MOTION PREVIOUSLY ENTERED BY JUDGE FUCHS IS TO
BE SUBMITTED TO THE COURT FOR SIGNATURE. THE JURISDICTIONAL
ISSUE WILL BE SUBMITTED TO THE COURT FOR DECISION. PARTIES
RESOLVE THAT A TRIAL DATE IN MARCH WILL BE SET.

ofiom

c; r

p. r*

FILED EY. jfL?_
RANDY S. LUDLOW #2011
Attorney for Defendant
311 South State Street, Suite 280
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-1300
Fax: (801) 539-8236
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
VICTOR OGDEN, et al.,

ORDER OP DISMISSAL

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 940900038CN

IB PRINTING COMPANY, et al.,

Judge John A. Rokich

Defendant.
THE ABOVE ENTITLED MATTER having been presented to the court
on defendant's Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Code
of Judicial Administration.

Each of the parties filed Memorandums

together with Affidavits and supporting

documentation.

undisputed that the business was incorporated

It is

in the State of

Nevada with its principle place of business being in Wendover,
Nevada.

The purpose of the business was to provide printing for

the casinos in Wendover, Nevada.

The officers and directors are

and were Nevada residents except for plaintiffs.
located
minimal.

in the State of Nevada.

The equipment is

The contacts with Utah were

Based upon the foregoing it is hereby ordered as follows:
1.

Defendant's request for evidentiary hearing is denied.

2. Defendants Motion to Dismiss is granted without prejudice.
The most convenient forum to hear this matter is in Nevada.

The

controversy arose in Nevada; the ease and access to prove or
disprove the claims would be the State of Nevada; the costs
involved are more readily adjudicated in the State of Nevada; and
the availability of witnesses and the enforcement of the judgement
would require that the matter be adjudicated in the State of
Nevada.
3.

The court incorporates by reference the defendant's

memorandum in support of granting defendant's Motion to Dismiss.
DATED this

/

day of January, 1995.
By t h e Court:

J>JL*4?JJi.
JCohr^/ A. Rokich

00002011.95
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HAND DELIVERY CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I hand delivered a true and correct copy
of the foregoing ORDER OF DISMISSAL, by hand delivering the same in
a sealed envelope, this

/ 3 ^

day of January, 1995 to the

following:
JULLIAN D. JENSEN
311 SOUTH STATE, SUITE 380
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111

L7

W/dlttff,

HAND DELIVERY CERTIFICATE
The above document was also hand delivered on the

/_

day of

March, 1995 to the following:
JULLIAN D. JENSEN
311 SOUTH STATE, SUITE 380
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111

CZT

^Ai?(m/^<

00002011.95
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FILED DY_..^_._
IN THE

THIRD DISTRICT COURT

TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY
OGDEN, VICTOR
PLAINTIFF

vs
IB PRINT COMPANY

CASE NUMBER 940300038 CN
DATE 01/23/95
HONORABLE JOHN A. ROKICH
COURT REPORTER
COURT CLERK RGB

DEFENDANT
TYPE OF HEARING:
PRESENT:
P. ATTY. JENSEN, JULIAN D-NOT PRESENT
D. ATTY. LUDLOW, RANDY S-NOT PRESENT

THE COURT AFFIRMS ITS DECISION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S
COMPLAINT WITHOUT PREJUDICE BECAUSE PLAINTIFF VOLUNTARILY
PARTICIPATED IN THE INCORPORATION OF THE BUSINESS IN NEVADA AND
DESIGNATING NEVADA AS THE PRINCIPAL PLACE OF BUSINESS.
IN SUMMA CORPORATION VS. LANCER INDUSTRIES(559 P 2D 544)THE
UTAH SUPREME COUNT RULED THAT DISTRICT COURTS, AS COURTS OF
GENERAL JURISDICTION, HAVE INHERENT POWER TO REFUSE TO EXERCISE
JURISDICTION IF CONVINCED THAT TO DO OTHERWISE WOULD PLACE AN
UNREASONABLE BURDEN UPON SOME OR ALL OF THE PARTIES OR UPON THE
COURT. THE COURT HAS EXCERCISED ITS INHERENT POWERS.
Dated Jan. 23, 1995

?JU<I3£
c/c Counsel

nnr.-i o r ;

/;

. t- >.

RANDY S. LUDLOW #2011
Attorney for Defendant
311 South State Street, Suite 280
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-1300
Fax: (801) 539-8236

\

\

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
VICTOR OGDEN,

ORDER AFFIRMING DISMISSAL

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 940300038CN

IB PRINTING COMPANY,

Judge John A. Rokich

Defendant.
THE PLAINTIFF, by and through its attorney of record, Julian
Jensen has requested the court through informal means to reconsider
its decision. Based upon such request and for good cause appearing
herein
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:
The
complaint

Court

affirms

without

its

prejudice

decision

to

because

dismiss

plaintiff

plaintiff's
voluntarily

participated in the incorporation of the business in Nevada and
designating Nevada as the principal place of business.
In Summa Corporation vs. Lancer Industries (559 P 2D 544) the
Utah Supreme Court ruled that District Courts, as courts of general
jurisdiction,

have

inherent

'<>

power

to

refuse

to

exercise

nnn-i

^Q

jurisdiction if convinced that to do otherwise would place an
unreasonable burden upon some or all of the parties or upon the
court.

The court has exercised its inherent powers.

DATED this

# 3 day of Januaryr1995.
BY THE COURT:

J.OHN' A . R O K I C H

'

District court Judge

00002037.95
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing ORDER AFFIRMING DISMISSAL, by placing the
same in the United States Mail, in a postage pre-paid sealed
envelope, this * Z - T ^ day of January, 1995 to the following:
JULIAN D. JENSEN
311 SOUTH STATE, SUITE 380
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111
teslie Frederick
Secretary

00002037.95
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JULIAN D. JENSEN (1679)
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB & JACKSON
Attorneys for Plaintiff
311 South State, Suite 380
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-6600

c-:
TILE

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

VICTOR OGDEN and ANGIE OGDEN,
husband and wife,

NOTICE OF APPEAL
Plaintiffs,
vs.
IB PRINTING COMPANY, a Utah Joint
Venture, and Gary Richards, Mary
Richards, Michelle Richards, and
Ronald Richards, and related parties,

Civil No. 940300038

Judge: John A. Rokich
Defendants.

Notice is hereby given that VICTOR OGDEN hereby appeals to the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah from that certain final Order Affirming Dismissal as entered the 23rd
day of February, 1995, by the above entitled Court; and the previous Order of Dismissal
entered the 8th day of March, 1995. A copy of the respective Orders are attached
hereto.
DATED this /4__ day of March, 1995.
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB & JACKSON

J-

JulianyD. Jensen
Jrney for VicUSr'Ogden

MAJUNG CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF
APPEAL, by placing the same in the U. S. Mail, postage prepaid, on this ty day of
March, 1995, addressed to:
Mr. Randy S. Ludlow, Esq.
311 South State, Suite 280
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

'f/AM^
Jensen,
ey for Plaintiff

WILSON AND BARROWS, LTD.
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
STEWART R. WILSON

RICHARD G. BARROWS

442 COURT ST.

ORVDLLE R. WILSON

PHONE# 702-738-7271

ELKO, NEVADA 89801

OF COUNSEL

FAX# 702-738-5041
P.O. Box 389-ZIP 89803

October 24, 1994
W. Brett Hansen, Esq.
Attorney at Law
380 Court Street
Elko, Nevada 89801
Re:

Richards v. Ogden

Dear Brett:
I'm writing as a follow up to my letter dated September 13, 1994. Because
you have given me an open ended extension to file the Ogden Motion to Quash, and
because neither I nor Mr. Ogden want me to unnecessarily incur fees, I am not in a hurry
to receive the documentation that you have promised to give me with regard to the
corporation and Mr. Ogden's contacts with the State of Nevada. However, I am writing
now so that there is no misunderstanding that I am not working on the Motion to Quash,
because I am still waiting for the documentation described in my letter to you dated
September 13, 1994.
If you have any questions, please contact me.
Sincerely,
RICHARD G. BARROWS

cc:
Julian D. Jensen, Esq.
311 South State Street, Suite 380
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
94100041.BDW

WILSON AND BARROWS, LTD.
ATTORNEYS AT LAW

STEWART R WILSON
RICHARD G BARROWS

442 COURT ST.
ELKO, NEVADA 898OI

ORVILLER WILSON
OF COUNSEL

PHONE* 702-738-7271
FAX# 702-738-5041
PO Box 389-ZIP 89803

September 13, 1994

W. Brett Hansen, Esq.
Attorney'at Law
3S0 2b\irt Street
to, Nevada 89801
Re: Richards v. Ogden
Dear Brett:
I am writing to confirm our recent conversations regarding the above case
and to thank you for your courtesies:
1.
I have advised you that I will be representing Victor Ogden who
intends to defend the Nevada lawsuit of Richards v. Ogden.
2.
I have been advised by Mr. Ogden's Utah counsel that Mr. Ogden
has done nothing in Nevada out of which this cause of action arose. A.s a result, I have
questioned whether Nevada has personal jurisdiction over Mr. Ogden.
3.
You have graciously given me an open-ended extension to respond
to the Complaint, revocable upon ten days' prior written notice for any reason.
4.
Prior to me filing Motion to Quash Service of Process on
jurisdictional grounds, you have agreed to give me the documentary and other evidence
giving Nevada jurisdiction over Mr. Ogden in this case.
5.
You have also agreed to give me a copy of all corporate documents,
including Minutes of all meetings, Bylaws, etc.

W. Brett Hansen, Esq.
September 13, 1994
Page 2
Again, thank you for all of your courtesies.
Sincerely,
RICHARD G. BARROWS
cc:

Julian Jensen, Esq.

94090331 JAS

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Counsel for appellants affirms that he caused to be hand delivered on this 20th
day of July, 1995 two (2) copies of the Brief of Appellants to the office of counsel for
appellees addressed as follows:
Mr. Randy Ludlow, Esq.
Attorney for Appellees
311 South State Street, Suite 280
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
W*^ J * CgWWts-'
Jensen
for Appellants
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